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In the past few years, emergent disease
episodes have increased in the United States and
globally. The list of important emergent diseases
is impressive indeed and, given what we know
about disease ecology, it will only continue to
grow. Nearly all of these emergent disease
episodes have involved zoonotic infectious
agents; that is, they have involved the
transmission of the etiologic agent to humans
from an ongoing reservoir life cycle in animals or
arthropods, without the permanent establish-
ment of a new life cycle in humans. Fewer
episodes have involved species-jumping by the
etiologic agent; that is, they derive from an
ancient reservoir life cycle in animals but have
subsequently established a new life cycle in
humans that no longer involves an animal
reservoir.
Distinct Prevention and Control Strategies
Nearly all of the major topics for discussion
at this conference involve either zoonotic or spe-
cies-jumping infectious agents. Prevention and
control strategies for diseases caused by these
agents are different from those required for dis-
eases whose etiologic agent has long relied on
human-to-human transmission for its survival.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s
(CDC) acute infectious disease prevention and
control strategies were largely developed from
experiences with vaccine-preventable childhood
diseases, sexually transmitted diseases, hepati-
tis, and other diseases for which traditional clini-
cally based or laboratory-based surveillance can
provide the base for intervention activities such
as vaccination or antimicrobial chemotherapy. For
the zoonoses and for diseases caused by species-
jumping agents, prevention and control strategies
have come from diverse bases. At the heart of this
research have been individual scientists who have
spent whole careers accumulating highly special-
ized knowledge and experience. In fact, the work
of these scientists might best be described as fun-
damental research—research seeking the means
for disease control and prevention.
Predicting the Emergence of Zoonotic and
Species-Jumping Pathogens
In general, there is no way to predict when or
where the next important new zoonotic pathogen
will emerge or what its ultimate importance
might be. A pathogen might emerge as the cause
of a geographically limited curiosity, intermittent
disease outbreaks, or a new epidemic. No one
could have predicted the emergence or zoonotic
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nature of the bovine spongiform encephalopa-
thy prion in cattle in the United Kingdom in
1986, the emergence or zoonotic potential of Sin
Nombre virus as the cause of hantavirus
pulmonary syndrome in the Southwest in 1993,
and certainly not the species-jumping emer-
gence of HIV as the cause of AIDS in 1981.
Consequently, investigation at the first sign of
emergence of a new zoonotic disease is
particularly important, although the investiga-
tion usually resembles a field- and laboratory-
based research project rather than a typical case-
control–based outbreak investigation. This reality
must drive strategic planning for dealing with new
zoonotic diseases.
Factors Contributing to the Emergence of
Zoonotic Diseases
Many elements can contribute to the
emergence of a new zoonotic disease: microbial/
virologic determinants, such as mutation, natural
selection, and evolutionary progression; individual
host determinants, such as acquired immunity
and physiologic factors; host population determi-
nants, such as host behavioral characteristics
and societal, transport, commercial, and iatro-
genic factors; and environmental determinants,
such as ecologic and climatologic influences.
Emergence of new zoonotic pathogens seems
to be accelerating for several reasons: global
human and livestock animal populations have
continued to grow, bringing increasingly larger
numbers of people and animals into close contact;
transportation has advanced, making it possible
to circumnavigate the globe in less than the
incubation period of most infectious agents;
ecologic and environmental changes brought
about by human activity are massive; and
bioterroristic activities, supported by rogue
governments as well as organized amateurs, are
increasing, and in most instances the infectious
agents of choice seem to be zoonotic.
Ecologic Factors Contributing to the
Emergence of Zoonotic Diseases, as
Exemplified by Arbovirus Diseases
Contributing to the emergence of zoonotic
diseases is the capacity of microorganisms and
viruses to adapt to extremely diverse and
changing econiches. One of the most complex sets
of adaptations concerns the arboviruses and their
transmission by specific arthropods. When
ecosystems are altered, disease problems of
humans and animals follow. Population move-
ments and the intrusion of humans and domestic
animals into arthropod habitats have resulted in
emergent disease episodes, some of which are the
stuff of fiction. The classic example is the
emergence of yellow fever when humans entered
the Central American jungle to build the Panama
Canal—many contemporary examples suggest
that similar events will continue to occur.
Deforestation and settlement of new tropical
forest and farm margins have exposed farmers
and domestic animals to new arthropods and the
viruses they carry. Mayaro and Oropouche virus
infections in Brazilian woodcutters who cleared
the Amazonian forest in recent years is a case in
point. The opening up of isolated ecosystems has
contributed to emergent disease episodes.
Remote econiches, such as islands, with
immunologically naive potential reservoir hosts
and vectors are often particularly vulnerable to
an introduced virus. For example, the initial
Pacific island-hopping of Ross River virus in the
1980s from its original econiche in Australia
caused “virgin soil” epidemics of arthritis-
myalgia syndrome in Fiji and Samoa—this virus
will surely reemerge. Increased long-distance air
travel facilitates the movement of infected
persons and exotic arthropod vectors around the
world. The introduction of the Asian mosquito
Aedes albopictus to the United States in water
contained in used tires represents an unsolved
problem of this kind. Increased long-distance
livestock transportation facilitates the move-
ment of viruses and arthropods (especially ticks)
around the world. The introduction and
emergence of African swine fever virus from
Africa into the Americas in the 1960s and 1970s
seem prophetic; although this virus is not
zoonotic (it does not infect humans), this
experience should raise the question concerning
possible transport of Crimean-Congo hemor-
rhagic fever virus or other tick-borne pathogens
to new locales. Ecologic factors pertaining to
uncontrolled urbanization and environmental
pollution are contributing to many emergent
disease episodes. Arthropod vectors breeding in
accumulations of water (e.g., tin cans, old tires)
and sewage-laden water are a problem world-
wide. Environmental chemical toxicants (herbi-
cides, pesticides, residues) can also affect vector-
virus relationships directly or indirectly. Ecologic
factors related to expanding primitive irrigation
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disease emergence, as exemplified by the
emergence of Japanese encephalitis in newly
developed rice-growing areas of southern Asia.
New routings of long-distance bird migrations,
brought about by new man-made water impound-
ments, represent an important yet still untested
risk of introduction of arboviruses into new areas.
Global warming, which affects sea level,
estuarine wetlands, fresh water swamps, and
human habitation patterns, may also be affecting
vector-virus relationships throughout the trop-
ics; however, data are scarce and long-term
programs to study the effect of global warming
have too often not included the participation of
tropical medicine experts.
Of all the ecologic factors contributing to
arthropod-borne zoonotic viral disease emer-
gence, uncontrolled urbanization is the most
important. The mega cities of the tropics, with
their lack of sanitary systems, serve as
incubators for emerging zoonoses—they repre-
sent the most difficult zoonotic disease risks of
the next century. Who will pay to control disease
in these cities? How will the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Pan American
Health Organization (PAHO) serve the needs of
the people in these cities? How will CDC serve the
interests of the people of the United States in
preventing emergent zoonotic diseases from
emigrating from these cities? Lessons from the
past suggest that we need a larger national and
international enterprise to deal with emergent
zoonoses in such settings, but even more we need
an adaptable enterprise, one that can adjust
quickly to diverse episodes.
Lessons from Venezuelan Equine
Encephalitis Epidemics
Past Venezuelan equine encephalitis epidem-
ics provide lessons regarding today’s zoonotic
disease prevention and control systems. In 1971,
as the virus crossed from Mexico into Texas,
agricultural disease control authorities were
prepared to start shooting and burying horses in
a massive slaughter campaign. Scientists from
CDC and the Middle America Research Unit (at
the time a unit of the National Institutes of
Health) provided the virologic and epidemiologic
base to override the sanitary rifle strategy of
agricultural authorities, and the U.S. Army
provided its then new TC83 vaccine. Conflict
between agricultural and public health agencies
was rampant; if this kind of emergency happened
again, the response might not be much different.
If the epidemic in Venezuela and Columbia in 1995
had progressed and jumped north, which agency
would have stepped forward to direct control
activities? What would have been done? Do we have
an interagency plan? The same question might be
asked in regard to the possible introduction of Rift
Valley fever virus into the United States. In my
view, our government institutional culture fails in
long-term, interdisciplinary, interagency strategy
development—we need strategies that are proof-
tested to ensure success.
There is another lesson from the 1971 and
1995 Venezuelan equine encephalitis epidemics.
Thirty years ago the arbovirus community was
large, very experienced in field work and disease
control actions, and holistic in perspective and
expertise. Arbovirologists were able to bring
together all necessary expertise—entomology
and vector biology, ecology, mammology, orni-
thology, epidemiology, and virology. However,
today this community, like so many others
supporting zoonotic public health programs, is
very small, rather poorly experienced in field
work, and scientifically fragmented. Experts on
mosquito biology, genetics, ecology, and vector
competence are becoming more and more
separated from the people in local mosquito
control agencies who are expected to terminate
epidemics. We had better fix this, organization-
ally and culturally, if we are to deal with
mosquito-borne diseases in the 21st century.
Lessons from the Equine Morbillivirus
Outbreak in Australia
Recent experiences in Australia with a new
morbillivirus disease add still more lessons in
zoonotic disease prevention and control. In 1994,
horses on a property in Queensland developed
acute respiratory distress with hemorrhagic
manifestations—14 of 21 infected horses died. A
horse trainer and a stable-hand became ill after
nursing a sick horse—the trainer died. The
disease was found to be caused by a previously
unknown morbillivirus. Remarkably, in 1996
fruit bats (flying foxes) were found to be the
natural host of the virus. Studies are under way
to unravel these findings.
One lesson is similar to that taught by
experiences with Venezuelan equine encephali-
tis. In Australia, where animal disease research
is organized on a national basis but human
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activities) on a state basis, this disease was
given over to the Australian Animal Health
Laboratory. One can imagine the public outcry if
it had turned out that humans were at greater
risk than horses. Again, cooperation across a
wide range of institutions is required to deal
with zoonoses, but when human health is at risk,
I cannot imagine our public health institutions
deferring to animal disease and agricultural
institutions. Similar turf issues have been
raised in the United States and in the United
Kingdom in regard to the recent episode of
H5N1 influenza in chickens and humans in Hong
Kong.
Lessons from Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever
Epidemics
Should we be concerned about Ebola virus? Is
there a risk to Africa that compares with the
everyday problems of other zoonoses such as
malaria or yellow fever? Is there a risk to people
in North America or Europe? If the worst that
might happen is an occasional importation
resulting in a small cluster of cases, should we be
concerned? If the time and place of such episodes
are unpredictable, should we not just wait and
react after the fact? The risk reflected in these
questions is difficult to evaluate because we know
so little. However, we can say that as western-
style hospitals become more affordable for
Africans, nosocomial Ebola amplification will
increase, and epidemics will get larger.
These viruses and the diseases they cause
need to be understood because the risk they
represent is unknown and the risk for future
episodes is so unpredictable—the same should be
said in regard to all similarly lethal zoonotic
pathogens. For example, we need to find the
natural reservoir of Ebola virus and learn how its
prevalence in its natural environment and how
transmission to humans are regulated. In Africa,
the emergence of Ebola virus could dramatically
increase if its still unknown reservoir host(s)
increased, the virus changed its behavior, or
ecologic factors brought additional reservoir
hosts into play. We need to know enough to detect
such changes quickly. The concerned public
would not be satisfied if public health leaders
decided on a wait-and-see approach for dealing
with Ebola hemorrhagic fever or other diseases
with similar pathogenic potential.
Dealing with Ebola virus and similar very
dangerous infectious agents need not be
thought of as so expansive or expensive as to be
unrealistic. Field-based epidemiologic studies
are needed; diagnostic systems require better
placement in laboratories in Africa. Training is a
major need—not through short courses, but
rather through advanced career training and
experience; transcending these is the need for an
expanded research base, which in turn requires
more national laboratory facilities and resources
for work at biosafety level (BSL) 4. These needs
must be met in all industrialized countries on
behalf of developing countries.
Lessons from Rabies Epidemics
Rabies provides many lessons in how viral
adaptation contributes to emergence in new
econiches. Often, the necessary ecologic elements
are in place and the recipe for emergence simply
involves the introduction of virus; a dramatic
illustration was the appearance of epidemic
raccoon rabies in the eastern United States. The
epidemic was traced to raccoons imported from
Florida to West Virginia in 1977—as usual,
human perturbation of an ecosystem, in this
instance involving the transport of wild raccoons
from an endemic site, caused trouble. One key to
our understanding of this episode was the
discovery that rabies virus is not one virus;
rather, it is a set of different genotypes, each
transmitted within a separate reservoir host
econiche. In North America, there are six
terrestrial animal genotypes, including the
raccoon virus genotype. Raccoons bite raccoons
that bite raccoons, and after some time, their
virus becomes a distinct genotype, highly
adapted to the host cycle. When the full
significance of this discovery was realized, many
mysteries of rabies ecology were clarified. The
lesson here is that modern virologic research is
the key for prevention and control programs such
as those carried out by the CDC Rabies
Laboratory and the Texas State Health Depart-
ment, which is achieving much success with its
coyote vaccination program.
Lessons from the Hantavirus Pulmonary
Syndrome Epidemic
In 1993, hantavirus pulmonary syndrome
was first recognized in the southwestern United
States. Cases have been found in 28 states; as of
1997, more than 164 cases had been confirmed in433 Vol. 4, No. 3, July–September 1998 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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the United States and more than 400
throughout the Americas—the death rate has
been approximately 45%. At the beginning of the
investigation, serologic tests provided the first
clue about the nature of the causative virus.
Viral RNA was amplified from patient
specimens, and a previously unknown hantavirus,
now named Sin Nombre virus, was uncovered.
Later, scientists from CDC, the University of
New Mexico, and elsewhere found that several
variant viruses were distributed over large
areas of the United States, all previously
unknown, all entrenched in specific rodent
reservoirs, all capable of zoonotic transmission
to humans.
The laboratory and field work resembled
fundamental field- and laboratory-based re-
search, not a traditional outbreak investigation.
Sin Nombre virus and its relatives could only be
dealt with in laboratories with the most
sophisticated molecular biologic and immuno-
logic technologies, the most expert staff
scientists, and the kind of global perspective seen
in WHO international reference centers. If
scientists in these laboratories compete rather
than collaborate, how will public health be given
priority? How will technology transfer occur as
rapidly as needed? How will the full capacity of
more specialized biomedical research laborato-
ries be brought to bear?
The tradition of public service holds the
answer. When the rabies immunofluorescence
test was developed at CDC, it was made available
immediately to state and other laboratories.
When Legionella pneumophila was discovered,
cultures and reagents were made available
immediately to everyone concerned. This tradi-
tion, in turn, has led over the years to the
immediate transfer to CDC of new infectious
agents isolated in other laboratories—Marburg
virus from Germany, Lassa virus from Yale, HIV
from France, poliovirus isolates from every-
where. Research competition has never been the
point—public health has been the purpose at
hand. The perpetuation of this tradition seems
extremely important.
Lessons from the Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy Epidemic in Cattle and
New-Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in
Humans
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in
the United Kingdom may provide more lessons
than any other recent emergent zoonotic
disease episode. The disease was first
diagnosed in the United Kingdom in 1986; as of
1997, more than 170,000 cattle had been
reported as infected, but modern statistical
methods have indicated that about one million
cattle had been infected, roughly half of which
entered the human food chain in the United
Kingdom.
Today, with the wisdom of hindsight, it might
be said that the ministry of agriculture in the
United Kingdom failed to react in time to what
was clearly a great risk to the livestock and
related food industries of the country—every
element of its disease prevention and control
responsibilities might be called into question. By
1990, the front pages of British newspapers were
filled with BSE articles, forcing the question
“…does BSE pose a risk to human health?”
British government officials responded, “…there
is nothing to worry about…” This of course led
the public to become more skeptical. The
editors of the journal Nature reacted as follows:
…Never say there is no danger [risk]. Instead, say that
there is always a danger [risk], and that the problem is
to calculate what it is… Never say that the risk is
negligible unless you are sure that your listeners
share your own philosophy of life…
In my view, this response sums up one of the
central precepts of public health practice.
In 1995, the BSE agent was reported to be the
cause of a new human zoonotic disease, new-
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. By 1997, 26
cases had been reported in the United Kingdom
and one in France. A recent report from The
Royal Society states that there is now a
compelling case regarding new-variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease as the human mani-
festation of BSE. With such a small number of
cases, it is impossible to predict future numbers
of cases of the human disease, but clearly the
damage to the livestock and related food
industries of the United Kingdom will continue.
BSE may be instructive in other ways, especially
in its extension into the worlds of macroeconom-
ics, international trade, political science, and
even global governance.
In all these lessons, one of the most important
points is the need for greater epidemiologic
resources and better trained professionals for
dealing with human and animal diseases or with434 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 4, No. 3, July–September 1998
Special Issue
the zoonotic interface between the two. This
training component requires consideration of
all steps along the discovery-to-control con-
tinuum.
The Discovery-to-Control Continuum as
Applied to Zoonotic Diseases
Initial investigation at the first sign of
emergence of a new zoonotic disease must focus
on practical characteristics such as death rate,
severity of disease, transmissibility, and remote
spread, all of which are important predictors of
epidemic potential and societal risk. Various
elements of a discovery-to-control continuum are
usually called for: discovery, the recognition of a
new zoonotic disease in a new setting;
epidemiologic field investigation; etiologic inves-
tigation; diagnostics development; focused re-
search; technology transfer; training and out-
reach; and ultimately control, elimination, and
eradication. Of course, not all of these elements
are appropriate in every emerging zoonotic
disease episode—decisions must be made and
priorities must be set.
In the initial phases in the discovery-to-
control continuum, people outside the “citadel”
(the traditional federal community of investiga-
tors and officials) must be recognized—local
clinicians, pathologists (including medical exam-
iners and forensic pathologists), veterinarians
and animal scientists, ecologists, wildlife scien-
tists, as well as local public health officials, many
of whom have not been enamored of their
experiences in dealing with those inside the
citadel. The important early role of primary
diagnostic laboratories and the reference labora-
tory networks that support them must also be
recognized. In this era of the primacy of
molecular microbiology and virology, it bears
reminding that many of the early investigative
activities surrounding the identification of a
possibly emergent zoonotic disease must be
carried out in the field, not in the laboratory. This
is the world of shoe-leather epidemiology (the
logo of CDC’s Epidemic Intelligence Service
program is the outline of the sole of a shoe with a
prominent hole worn in it), as well as of molecular
microbiology and virology.
In the intermediate phases in the discovery-
to-control continuum, the continuum progresses
to the general area of risk management, the area
represented not by the question what’s going on
here? but by the question what are we going to do
about it? This phase may include expansion of
many elements: technology transfer involving
diagnostics development and proof testing,
vaccine and drug development and proof testing,
sanitation and vector control, and medical and
veterinary care activities and their adaptation to
the circumstances of the disease locale; commer-
cialization, where appropriate, of diagnostics,
vaccines, and therapeutic agents in quantities
needed and provision of these materials through
nongovernment organizations or government
sources; training, outreach, continuing educa-
tion, and public education, each requiring
professional expertise and adaptation to the special
circumstances of the disease locale; and communi-
cations, employing the technologies of the day such
as the Internet and professional expertise.
Further along the discovery-to-control con-
tinuum, activities become more complex. Frus-
tration often occurs at intermediate points as
administrators and politicians drag their feet in
regard to resource allocation. This frustration, in
turn, drives scientists back to their laboratories,
to the world of research, to the front end of the
continuum. Younger scientists, particularly,
become cynical of the harsh political world of risk
management, even though this is the arena in
which their discoveries must prove themselves.
More expensive and specialized expertise and
resources come into play in the final phases of the
discovery-to-control continuum: public health
systems, including rapid case-reporting sys-
tems, surveillance systems, vital records and
disease registers, staffing and staff support,
logistic support, legislation and regulation, and
expanded administration; special clinical sys-
tems, including isolation of cases, quarantine, and
patient care; and public infrastructure systems,
including sanitation and sewerage, safe food and
water supplies, and reservoir host and vector
control.
The question of facilities needs in the United
States is an element of our capacity to fulfill the
discovery-to-control continuum. What about
BSL-3+ and BSL-4 laboratory facilities west of
the Appalachians? Recent debate makes it clear
that having two BSL-4 facilities in the United
States (CDC in Atlanta, and the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
in Frederick, Maryland) and one in Canada (at
the new center in Winnipeg) is not enough. Plans
for a few small BSL-4 labs in U.S. academic
centers may help in expanding basic research435 Vol. 4, No. 3, July–September 1998 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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supported by competitive grants, but they will
not support expanded field-based research.
Which government agency will step forward to
solve this problem? And in a related way, which
government agency will step forward to solve the
unique problem of career-committed professional
personnel needs for dealing with emerging
zoonotic diseases?
Conclusions
Who will be the world’s doctor? Who will be
the world’s expert on zoonotic diseases? These
questions are taken from an editorial in the New
York Times, May 12, 1995. It seems that many
authorities, including those at CDC, are saying
that they have the answer to these questions in
regard to all emerging diseases. Their answers
have been in the form of proposals and funding
requests to expand global disease surveillance,
diagnostics, communications, and emergency
response systems, a global training program, and
a global stable funding base. However, somewhat
distinct strategies are needed to deal specifically
with emerging zoonotic diseases, and these
strategies have not been fully developed.
Examples have been given in this paper to
suggest that these strategies must involve more
of a field and laboratory research enterprise than
a traditional surveillance and reference diagnos-
tics enterprise. In some cases, it is not even clear
who might do the focused applied research that
must underpin advances in zoonotic disease
prevention and control. In present circum-
stances, where the survival of institutions is at
stake, turf battles are exacerbated, and
competition rather than cooperation between
academic institutions and government agencies
ensues. CDC may be getting new funds, but
there is no parallel sense of “good times ahead”
out in the country. This is happening in
contradiction to public expectations. Data
clearly show that the concerned public wants
more disease control and intervention actions,
more of the medical research needed to drive
such actions, and more participation across the
country. Numerous surveys of public opinion done
by Research!America show that the concerned
public is willing to pay. In my view, public
expectations can only be met by the integration
of the nascent global public health emerging
infectious disease network, with networks
focused on threats posed by livestock animal
diseases, crop plant diseases, and bioterrorism.
The public would see such an overall system as
having a high benefit:cost ratio, which would solve
several high priority problems most efficiently.
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